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ESSAY:  DEVELOPING APPROPRIATE 
STANDARDS FOR ACHIEVING DIVERSITY IN 
FACULTY APPOINTMENTS 
Guido Calabresi* 
 
I am writing today to talk about diversity within law school faculties.  And 
when I say “diversity,” I mean all sorts of diversities, not just the ones that 
most of those who address the issue tend to focus on.  I have, for many years, 
been thinking about the different types of diversities that seem crucial to a 
law school, and the appropriate ways of achieving them. 
Part I lists the categories of diversity that I think are important to 
considering diversity within law school faculties.  It then indicates a problem 
that inheres with this list.  Part II suggests how different schools may view 
the appropriateness of achieving some of these diversities.  And finally, in 
Part III, I will come to the main thesis of this piece and propose how schools 
can achieve the diversities they deem desirable. 
I.  CATEGORIES OF DIVERSITY 
I have come up with eight categories of diversity to be considered in hiring 
law school faculty.  The eight types of diversity I will discuss in this paper 
are:   
1. age diversity:  young and old; 
2. teacher and scholar diversity:  people who are primarily teachers and 
people who are primarily writers; 
3. subject matter diversity:  Tax Law, Tort Law, and so on; 
4. theory and practice diversity:  theoreticians and clinicians, for instance; 
5. diversity in theory of law:  natural law, “critical” approaches to law, legal 
realism, “law and . . .” , and so on; 
6. diversity in approach to the law:  whatever one’s theory of law may be, 
connecting law primarily to history, philosophy, economics, or some other 
extralegal field; 
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7. personal-characteristic diversity:  this is the one most talked about and 
includes gender and gender identity, race, sexual orientation, and religion 
(this type of diversity is related to, but a little different from, the age 
diversity mentioned above); and 
8. finally, ideological diversity. 
A problem that inheres with this list is that there might be what we could 
call a ninth category of diversities:  the diversity that results from the 
overlapping of diverse characteristics.  Some overlap is inevitable because 
people rarely bring just one characteristic to the table.  Take, for example, a 
faculty member who is a conservative lawyer-historian who teaches Family 
Law.  This faculty member contributes an ideological position, an approach 
to law, and a focus on a particular subject matter.  But is this type of 
“combined” diversity significant?  What would that school lose if the 
conservative historian taught another subject and a liberal non-
interdisciplinarian taught Family Law?  Does the school need both?  Another 
school may have an African American female economist who teaches 
Intellectual Property, a gender-nonconforming historian who teaches Local 
Law, and a moderate law and economics octogenarian teaching Tort Law.  
These overlapping diversities are terrific.  But what does each characteristic 
add to the school?  Would it matter, for example, if the economist was a 
philosopher instead? 
Some overlap cannot be achieved:  old and young (I try, but it does not 
work).  Some overlap is universally desired.  We all want to have a teacher 
who is a truly good scholar and a scholar who is a good teacher.  But, I 
suggest there is no special diversity served by having someone on the faculty 
who is both.  There are some overlaps in diversity that matter more than 
others.  For example, it may be important to have both a conservative and a 
liberal constitutional law professor, but is it also important to have a 
conservative and a liberal antitrust professor?  Is it worth going out of one’s 
way to have a Roman Catholic African American female on the faculty?  That 
would be a very interesting diversity.  But how significant in terms of 
diversity is it?  How many of these overlaps become a unique diversity, 
desirable in its own right?  It is not an easy question to answer, but one worth 
considering.  For the purpose of this Essay, however, I will focus on my 
original eight listed diversities. 
II.  HOW LAW SCHOOLS VALUE DIVERSITIES 
The next question is, how much diversity, and of what sort, does a law 
school want or need? 
Yale Law School in the 1930s thought of itself as a legal realist school.1  
That is what it was; it did not care terribly much about having other legal 
theories represented.  It is said that Professor Myres McDougal was sent off 
to Illinois by then Professor and eventual Dean Wesley Sturges because it 
 
 1. See generally LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE, 1927–1960 (1986). 
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was not clear that “Mac” was enough of a legal realist.2  He had, after all, 
come to Yale from Oxford University.3  And only when he had supposedly 
proven himself did Dean Charles Clark bring him back.4  That is what Yale 
was at that time.  While it was a very interesting law school, it was not truly 
a great law school. 
Similarly, other law schools have advertised their lack of diversity in 
theory or approaches to law.  Antonin Scalia School of Law at George Mason 
University has described itself as a school that specializes in law and 
economics, a very particular kind of thing.5  And there are some schools that 
specialize in the “practice of law,” saying that this is what they do.6  Other 
schools purport to focus on particular fields.  Vermont Law School, for a long 
time, specialized in environmental law and advertised itself specifically to 
people who were interested in environmental law.7  A school may well and 
properly want to specialize.  But I do not think that a law school can so limit 
itself and be truly great. 
Nevertheless, it is not necessary for my discussion that all schools treat 
diversity the same way.  Even great law schools will define diversity 
differently.  Somebody once said that Yale Law School thinks it is furthering 
diversity by having seven or eight different people teaching Freedom of 
Speech in 1920 because each of them look at the issues involved differently. 
I do think the one thing most law schools seem to agree on is that they 
must have subject matter diversity.  And it is kind of interesting to me how 
important that seems to them.  But the one kind of diversity the American 
Association of Law Schools (AALS) expressly requires is not subject matter 
diversity but personal-characteristic diversity.8  The AALS speaks of 
personal-characteristic diversity as something that is an essential part of a 
law school and makes it relevant to accreditation.9 
So, while I think that all great law schools want to be highly diverse in all 
eight categories previously listed, it remains up to each school to decide the 
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crucial details.  Different schools will have different views as to how many 
of these matter, which are the most important, and which combinations really 
matter in making a law school what it wants to be. 
III.  APPROPRIATE STANDARDS 
We come then to the main point of this paper:  What are the appropriate 
standards for faculty appointments to attain diversity? 
If you ask almost any law school what the standard for appointment is, the 
school will answer “excellence.”10  It will say, we appoint people who are 
excellent.  Now, the first thing to realize is that the measure of “excellence” 
differs widely from school to school.  For example, to be considered excellent 
at Yale is to be someone who has a real chance of breaking paradigms.11  
That is quite different from what is considered excellent at Harvard.  Harvard 
seems to want somebody who dominates a field and pushes it further.12  Now, 
it may be that a school like Yale has a comparative advantage in trying to get 
paradigm breakers and Harvard a comparative advantage in getting people 
who are genuinely original in moving a field further (without worrying about 
whether they completely redo it).  This advantage may be why these schools 
in practice define excellence as they do.  I tend to think so.  And other law 
schools will likewise define excellence in line with their vision of 
themselves. 
In the end, excellence probably means what makes a particular school look 
good in relation to its competitors.  For example, an appointment may meet 
a school’s excellence standard if its competitors will say “damn good 
appointment.”  But all of this shows just how different “excellence” really is. 
More crucially, what is considered excellent also differs within every 
school.  It is not a unitary standard.  And anyone who thinks that it is a 
consistent standard should go back and look at appointments that have been 
made in any given school.  Such a look will readily show just how different 
that standard has been in practice. 
For example, a school may have a subject matter that is oversubscribed, 
meaning the school already has a large number of people teaching that 
subject.  This oversubscription does not mean the school will never make an 
appointment in that area, but the appointment will have to be a superstar.  
And that is different from mere excellence. 
This is true even in a place like Yale that claims it does not slot-fill.  When 
it comes to the ninth person who wants to teach Constitutional Theory of the 
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First Amendment in the 1920s, it is not that Yale will not make that 
appointment.  But to be appointed, such a scholar has to be much more than 
the excellent kind of person Yale normally goes after.  Law schools are not 
as rigid on this as arts and science departments, where if a field, broadly 
defined, is full, there will be no room except for someone who is even more 
than a superstar.  Great law schools tend to have more flexibility.  And yet, 
at some point, even they change their standards. 
For this paper, though, what is more important in terms of the application 
of different standards is what happens when a school is trying to achieve 
diversity.  Let me give you an example.  Many years ago, George Mason—
holding itself out as a law and economics school—stated that it would not 
appoint someone who did not have a doctorate in economics.  That was a 
crucial part of its standard of excellence.  However, it appointed a tax guy 
who not only did not have a doctorate in economics, but who had never really 
studied economics.  I asked about this appointment and the answer I received 
was “we can’t not have a tax person.”  That is, subject matter diversity was 
so important that the school was willing, seemingly without even thinking 
deeply about it, to deviate from its usual standard. 
When I was on an AALS accreditation committee, George Mason was 
being questioned about its lack of women and African American faculty 
members.  The school’s answer was that there were very few women and 
African American lawyers who also had a doctorate in economics.  I then 
said:  “But you’re willing to do it for tax.  Why are you not willing to do it 
for these diversities?  In effect, you are telling me that one diversity is more 
important to you than another.  I’m not saying this can’t be valid, but I want 
you to justify it in terms of your school’s vision of itself and the AALS’s 
requirements.” 
In fact, it seemed to me then (and still seems to me) that George Mason 
had it exactly backward.  A school can deal with subject matter diversity by 
appointing visiting lecturers to cover the field for a time.  But it cannot deal 
with personal-characteristic diversity in the same way.  Visiting lecturers 
help to some extent.  But they do not supply personal-characteristic diversity 
in the same way as having a regular, tenured faculty member. 
The representative from George Mason did not answer my question at the 
time, and I soon after left the committee, so I do not know what ultimately 
happened.  But the school was clearly applying different standards in 
different situations. 
The most important difference in standards that law schools apply is the 
difference between the standard for promoting junior faculty to tenured 
positions and the standard for hiring professors laterally to tenured positions.  
I do not think that there is a school in the country that does not have a much 
easier standard for promotion than it does for making lateral appointments.  
We sometimes deny that this is so at Yale, but it is true there too. 
Every single law school I know of has a different standard, and there is 
good reason for it.  Thus, when you appoint a junior, if you are at a place like 
Yale, you hope that the junior will be a paradigm breaker, someone who is a 
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“genius.”  You try to get that person early because it is much harder to get 
such a person laterally.  So you look for the juniors who may become the 
Akhil Amars, the James Forman Jrs., or the Harold Kohs of their field.  You 
look for them and you hire them without tenure.  Some of those that you hire 
young turn out to be paradigm breakers, and, inevitably, others turn out “just” 
to be damn good, wonderful teachers, scholars, and citizens, but not people 
whom you would go out and try to steal from other places. 
So, what is one going to do?  Not promote those who turned out to be just 
fine, but not paradigm breakers?  If a school does that, it will not be able to 
get any of the juniors it originally wanted to get.  Why should a promising 
junior take the risk?  And, perhaps even more importantly, if a school fails to 
promote them, it will destroy its faculty’s collegiality.  Both of these are very 
good reasons for having a different standard, and we all take them for granted 
and employ a different standard.  But, in fact, these are no better reasons to 
have a different standard than the need to have diversity.13 
In other words, having a different standard in promoting juniors than in 
making lateral tenure appointments is justified because it helps a school.  But 
so does diversifying.  Why, then, should we not apply the promotion standard 
to lateral appointments that give us any of the diversities I listed? 
And that is of course the thesis of this paper.  I believe that, as to six of the 
eight diversities that I listed, a school should apply a promotion standard to 
get diversity by hiring laterally.  And I also believe that no one can justifiably 
say to a school that applying a promotion standard is going below its standard 
of excellence to get diversity.  The school is simply applying a standard that 
it regularly employs.  And it is doing so for a reason that is very, very good. 
I have said that I would apply this modified lateral standard—the 
promotion standard—in order to further six of the eight types of diversity I 
have listed.  Which are the two that I would not treat that way? 
The first is theory and practice diversity.  There, my standard is separate 
but equal.  Separate but equal—I use that pejorative-laden phrase 
intentionally to cause people to worry.  It is both something that I think is 
worth doing in that area and it causes the problems that separate but equal 
always causes.  As I will discuss, though, I think those problems can be dealt 
with. 
The other area in which I would not apply the modified standard may well 
be highly controversial.  I do not think one should apply a more favorable 
standard in order to get ideological diversity.  I do believe that ideological 
diversity is every bit as important as the others, but I have reasons for 
concluding that one probably should not deviate from the ordinary lateral 
appointment standard in this area.  I will discuss them shortly. 
 
 13. It is sometimes said that the difference between a promotion and a lateral-appointment 
standard is that a faculty knows some relevant facts—such as teaching ability—when it 
promotes, but takes a risk as to these facts with lateral appointments.  And so, the faculty is 
justified in requiring more as to what is known (i.e., quality of scholarship) in the latter.  That 
may well be an additional “good reason,” though it can be diminished by having laterals be 
appointed only after having a visiting appointment. 
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As to the others, personal-characteristic and age diversity, subject matter, 
teacher-scholar, theories of law, and approach to law, I would apply the 
promotion standard to lateral appointments that would further diversity. 
It is interesting that those people who are big on applying a more favorable 
standard to achieve subject matter diversity, and will do it in that area without 
thinking about it (and will do it also to further diversity in theories and 
approaches to law), are often the people who are most opposed to doing 
something analogous to achieve personal-characteristic diversity.  
Conversely, those who are most willing to apply a favorable standard to 
achieve diversity in personal characteristics (and will do it also to further 
diversity in theories and approaches to law) are least interested in anything 
of the sort where it would serve to get actual subject matter diversity.  I do 
not know what it is that causes people, individual teachers, to break in that 
way.  My own view, though, is that they are both wrong because all of these 
diversities are essential to being a truly great law school. 
There are obviously problems, legal problems, with respect to each.  The 
right-wing equal protectionists contend that one cannot favor personal-
characteristic diversity.  I never bought that position, but it is certainly being 
argued today.  Age diversity obviously runs into Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act (ADEA) problems.14  On the other hand, I do believe there 
is a great advantage in not just having octogenarian torts teachers.  The 
AALS, instead, is much more concerned, and understandably so, with 
personal-characteristic diversity.15  And it does suggest that accreditation 
may depend on achieving it.  It may also look to subject matter diversity.  But 
the AALS does not worry terribly much about the other forms of diversity.  
The American Bar Association (ABA) has recently paid a great deal of 
attention to practice, as against theory, diversity.  But, all these legal and 
organizational pressures, although important, are not the topic of this piece. 
Before I turn to why I would treat two of my eight diversities differently 
from the others, it may be worthwhile to spend a little time on why I treat 
theory of law and approach to law separately, and each as demanding 
attention.  I think that there really is a difference in the theory of law that one 
has—natural law, legal process, formalism, “law and . . .”—and that a great 
school should want diversity of such theories.  But I also believe a great 
school should seek people who look at different theories of law from the 
perspective of different outside disciplines.  One should not want all “law 
and . . .” people to be law and economics scholars or legal philosophers.  
Similarly, one does not want all critical legal theorists or legal realists to be 
historians of law or sociologists. 
I have two stories that speak to the point.  When I became Dean of Yale 
Law School in 1985, I told my faculty colleagues at Yale, which at the time 
was having some trouble hiring, that we were going to do a lot of good hiring.  
 
 14. See 29 U.S.C. § 623 (2012). 
 15. See Recruitment and Retention of Minority Law Faculty Members, ASS’N AM. L. 
SCHOOLS, https://www.aals.org/about/handbook/good-practices/minority-law-faculty-
members [https://perma.cc/5JHW-62RZ] (last visited Nov. 15, 2018). 
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I knew I would be good at it and that I would be able to get the money to do 
it.  I also told them that the first ones we would appoint would probably all 
be law and economics people, with different theories of law and in different 
subject matter areas, but all economics oriented.  I said this because I believed 
that, given the school’s and my own strength, we could hire the very best in 
legal education who approached law that way.  And we did.  But I also told 
my colleagues:  “do not worry, when we have demonstrated that we can hire 
the best, that we no longer have problems in hiring, we will be right back 
with philosophers, historians, and all other ‘-ologists.’”  And so we did. 
My other tale has to do with my own scholarly history.  When in 1965, I, 
already having tenure, was writing The Costs of Accidents,16 I was invited by 
Konrad Zweigert, then the God of European law, to the Max Planck Institute 
in Hamburg to explain what I was doing.  I went there and I talked about my 
work.  At the end of my presentation, Zweigert leaned forward and said, 
“That is very interesting, Calabresi, but you must realize that it is not law and 
it is not legal scholarship.”  I answered rather rudely, “It may not be now, but 
it soon will be.”  The two people on either side of him laughed.  He looked 
at them, as only a Herr Professor can, and they stopped in mid-laugh.  But, 
in time, each of them became head of the Max Planck.  And, as I have often 
said, what happened later is that law and economics not only became law and 
legal scholarship, but to many scholars, in more than one university in the 
United States, it became the only thing that was law and legal scholarship.  
Having seen it both ways, I expect, is a reason why I believe that diversity in 
approaches to law is crucial. 
Of course, how much a school that is lacking any of these diversities can 
do to broaden itself will depend on how much that school can afford.  
Finances will also in part determine how particularized any school will be in 
defining diversity:  whether, in other words, the school will go beyond my 
eight categories and worry about what I earlier termed a possible ninth 
category, consisting of overlapping diversities.  And this will be true as to 
each of the diversities I have listed.  For example, can a school afford to 
define diversity so as to treat as different, and worth extra effort to have, an 
African American woman because she is Catholic?  Can a school afford to 
treat having a scholar who teaches The First Amendment in 1920 and one 
who teaches The First Amendment in 1950 as adding important subject 
matter diversity?  Both of these will depend on the school’s resources and 
priorities.  To the extent that a school can afford them, though, at least the 
eight diversities I listed are all desirable and necessary.  And to the extent 
that a school can hire somebody who is teaching elsewhere, and whom the 
school would promote were that person already on the faculty, then, I believe, 
the school has a duty to try to make that appointment. 
My focus in this Essay is on lateral appointments.  I think it is less 
important to focus as much on original, junior appointments.  I believe that 
each kind of diversity is more easily achieved as to original nontenured 
 
 16. See generally GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS:  A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC 
ANALYSIS (1970). 
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appointments, and, therefore, that no modification of standards is needed 
there.  Because society has broadened, it is now easier to make appointments 
of juniors that have personal-characteristic diversity.  The pool has become 
much larger as past prejudices have diminished.  That is, while our past 
histories may narrow the pool of lateral candidates who are diverse in 
personal characteristics, that history affects the pool for junior, original 
appointees less.  And, there is no reason to think that paradigm breakers (or 
however a school defines excellence) cannot be found in the pool of diverse 
juniors. 
Similarly, junior appointees can be pushed into different subject matters.  
That is the dean’s job.  As a result, I think that as to the initial junior 
appointments, the problem can be dealt with adequately without playing with 
standards. 
But lateral, senior appointments are crucial.  A school is defined by the 
people it has at the top, and hence its diversity is reflected in the degree of 
diversity it has at the top.  For these reasons, I have focused on the standards 
schools should use to hire laterally. 
*          *          * 
I must now explain why I would not apply a promotion standard to lateral 
hiring to achieve two of the eight listed diversities. 
I would not do it as to theory and practice diversity because I think that the 
skills there are sufficiently different that if a school tries to get somebody 
who is a pretty good clinician and writes scholarly articles pretty well, it will 
get someone who is likely to be mediocre on both counts.  As a result, a 
school should seek to get, as clinical teachers, the best available hands-on 
practitioners who know what really good clinical work is.  A school should 
not worry about whether they have written a single damn thing.  I feel the 
same way as to theoreticians.  If they are truly good theorists, the fact that 
they have never set foot in a courtroom should not keep them from being 
hired (and I am here being autobiographical of course, but any number of 
great scholars like Bruce Ackerman will do as well).  This approach will give 
a school the best theoreticians available. 
Great schools need both great practice-oriented teachers and top-flight 
theoreticians.  And both are readily available so long as one does not ask that 
they be excellent in more than one of the two characteristics.  Hence if we 
keep clinical and academic appointments separate, there is no need to modify 
standards.  The way a school gets excellence in both is the way we have done 
it at Yale Law School.  Yale is the most theoretical of law schools 
academically, but it also has the most hands-on clinical program.  Its clinical 
programs and its clinical professors are even more hands-on than NYU’s 
(another school with a great clinical program).  At Yale, precisely because 
we are so theoretical on the academic side, we seek and succeed in getting 
clinicians who are simply truly fine clinical practitioners. 
This, of course, is a separate-but-equal approach to achieve diversity.  And 
any separate-but-equal approach creates problems because separate often 
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means not equal.  Moreover, in America, given our history of separate and 
fiercely unequal treatment of African Americans, the very words “separate 
but equal” sound infamous.  Interestingly, this is not the case in Europe, 
which, lacking our history, often reacts quite positively to such approaches.  
Still we have to live and deal with all that separate but equal connotes here. 
To make matters worse, separateness that is not equal has frequently been 
a problem with the way clinicians have been treated in law schools.  The only 
way a school can make such an approach work is if that school is genuine 
about equality.  The school must truly recognize that clinicians are as 
important to the school and should be treated as well as the theorists.  I 
consider this one of my great achievements as dean.  I made the salary of the 
clinicians equivalent to the salaries of top academic professors.  I got “Named 
Chairs” for clinicians and gave them sabbaticals.  I made their views 
dominant in the making of all clinical appointments.  As a result, clinicians 
now get treated with as much respect as all others on the faculty. 
There are many places where separate but equal in this area has not 
worked.  So it is dangerous.  But I believe that if one is really serious about 
equality, separate but equal can work in this area.  Of course, it works best 
when one gets some individuals who are genuinely good at both practice and 
theory.  In that case, the school should gladly recognize that fact and appoint 
them to both categories.  They become both clinical professors and academic 
professors.  Yale has recently done that as to James Forman, Jr.17  He is 
clearly top-of-the-line under Yale’s “excellence” standard for both.  Such an 
occasional union of practice and theory serves to emphasize the respect given 
to both, and thereby to make separate-but-equal treatment succeed. 
And so I come to what I think is the most controversial diversity area:  
ideology.  Let me start by emphasizing what I said earlier.  I believe that 
ideological difference is as important in a law school as each of the other 
kinds of diversity I listed.  Lawyers are not mathematicians and it is very 
important that there be law school teachers who are far right, far left, far 
center, far this, far that, and far the other.  This is essential if we are going to 
give our students the kind of legal education they need.  So why not say that 
schools should further ideological diversity in the same way that I urge in 
other diversities?  I have two reasons. 
The first is the impression I have that, if a school self-consciously tries to 
hire people laterally because of their ideological differences, that school will 
tend to create factions in the faculty.  Self-consciously seeking the other 
characteristics does not seem to do that. 
Appointment decisions are the most heated ones that faculties make.  They 
are what faculties get the most mad about, and they can result in losing 
important faculty members.  Yale lost Grant Gilmore for a number of years 
because he was mad about an appointment.  But losing even the most 
important faculty members, while costly, can be overcome.  Creating factions 
 
 17. James Forman, Jr., YALE L. SCH., https://law.yale.edu/james-forman-jr 
[https://perma.cc/S2SY-Z585] (last visited Nov. 15, 2018). 
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that solidify destroys a school.  Still, the dean can do a lot in most 
appointment situations to avoid the creation of factions. 
The dean has a fair amount of control over the timing of appointment 
discussions, and can use that control to reduce the chances of faculty factions 
being created.  I used to do this all the time.  Assume I had an appointment 
coming up, about which I knew that Robin and John fiercely opposed each 
other.  It seemed likely that they would walk out of the meeting with Robin 
saying something like:  “John is a blankety-blank scoundrel, conniving, 
cheating, etc.”  And John might be saying the same about her.  They might 
even go out and slam doors, shouting at each other.  (Once, before I became 
dean, I walked down the halls after an appointments meeting slamming doors 
and shouting at Tony Kronman.  We were screaming at each other because 
of an appointment we disagreed about.)  As dean, I would make sure that the 
next appointment that came up was one in which Robin and John were on the 
same side, so they would come out marveling at how wise, how thoughtful, 
how careful, the other was, while getting mad at someone else.  As a result, 
factions did not form.  (Similarly, Tony Kronman and I remained good 
friends after that incident.  And I was delighted to have him succeed me as 
dean). 
My experience has been, however, that when a faculty focuses on ideology 
directly, it is very difficult to avoid the creation of permanent splits.  And so, 
direct attention to ideology is dangerous.  It would still be worth doing, 
however, if there were not ways of achieving ideological diversity indirectly.  
I believe there are. 
My contention, and I am not 100 percent happy with it, is that if a faculty 
is genuinely concerned with subject matter, approach, and theory diversity, 
then it will get an adequate amount of ideological diversity as well.  How this 
works will differ over time.  In the 1930s, constitutionalists were by and large 
conservative,18 while antitrust people were on the left.19  If a faculty was 
careful to have both fields well covered, it was likely also to cover “left” and 
“right.”  The same would be true as to theories of law.  In the United States 
in the 1930s, formalists were conservative20 and “law and . . .” people were 
“dangerous” lefties.21  Such correlations change, of course.  Thus, in the 
1970s, constitutionalists were often lefties,22 and antitrust teachers were 
frequently righties.23  Similarly, “law and . . .” theorists in the 1970s often 
were conservatives.24 
 
 18. See Robin West, Progressive and Conservative Constitutionalism, 88 MICH. L. REV. 
641, 665–67 (1990). 
 19. See Edward O. Correia, Antitrust and Liberalism, 40 ANTITRUST BULL. 99, 109 (1995) 
(citing John Dewey, The Future of Liberalism, 32 J. PHIL. 225, 225–27 (1935)). 
 20. See Ofer Raban, Between Formalism and Conservatism:  The Resurgent Legal 
Formalism of the Roberts Court, 8 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 343, 344–46 (2014). 
 21. See Justin Desautels-Stein, A Context for Legal History, or, This Is Not Your Father’s 
Contextualism, 56 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 29, 32–33 (2016). 
 22. See Ronald K. L. Collins & David M. Skoller, The Future of Liberal Legal 
Scholarship, 87 MICH. L. REV. 189, 189 (1988). 
 23. See Correia, supra note 19, at 102–03. 
 24. See Desautels-Stein, supra note 21, at 33. 
970 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 87 
When a faculty diversifies as to subject matter, theory, or approach to law, 
it is not making appointments that are strictly ideological.  The greatest of 
the legal realists, Arthur Corbin, was a conservative and still was fully a legal 
realist.25  And a pretty good law and economics guy, Guido Calabresi, was 
something of a lefty at a time when most law and economics scholars were 
not.  If all of this is so, my contention is that a faculty that is really serious 
about achieving diversity in subject matter, theory, and approach to law will 
get an adequate amount of ideological diversity as well.  And significantly, 
it will get that without having the particular focus on ideology that I think is 
destructive.  Because of the semi-hemi-demi-correlation, it does not work out 
badly.  And these diversities will also bring about ideological diversity. 
There is a problem, though.  How should we define ideological difference?  
If ideological difference, to be sufficient, is not simply membership on a 
faculty as a whole, but must also be ideological difference within particular 
fields, my approach may not work.  For example, in the 1980s, Yale Law 
School had any number of conservatives on the faculty.  But they were almost 
all lawyer-economists.  And many were teaching antitrust.  Somebody could 
have properly said, Yale does not have a single constitutional law 
conservative on its faculty.  My approach might lead only to such an 
inadequate result.  If it is important to have diversity within subject matter 
fields, within theory, and within legal approach, my indirect way may well 
fail. 
But over time, the indirect approach may achieve even this more nuanced 
ideological diversity.  I do not think much of originalism, but it certainly is 
an important current legal theory.  And, by and large, originalists today tend 
to be conservative.  Moreover, they tend to be conservative as to 
constitutional law.  Once again, the correlation is not total.  In a way, Hugo 
Black was an originalist but he certainly was not a conservative.  If a faculty 
says, we ought to have some originalists on the faculty for diversity reasons, 
and then uses the promotion standard to hire an originalist laterally, today 
that faculty would likely also meet the abovementioned, more nuanced, 
definition of ideological diversity. 
I am not sure.  And I guess if it did not work, I would be willing to face 
the problem of ideological diversity head on because I think that such 
diversity is truly important.  But avoiding the risk of factions still makes me 
hope that even the more nuanced—within field—ideological diversity can be 
adequately achieved indirectly. 
CONCLUSION 
These then are my two exceptions to applying the promotion standard to 
lateral appointments in order to achieve diversity.  As to all the other types 
of diversity, I see no excuse for not doing so.  And because I see no excuse 
for not doing it, I think there is a duty to employ that standard in such cases.  
And I believe it to be a duty that applies across the board. 
 
 25. KALMAN, supra note 1, at 139–40. 
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A “great” faculty can make do for a time—if it cannot find those who meet 
even that standard—by appointing lecturers, visitors, and so on.  But the 
faculty should be aware that diversity is not achieved equally well as to 
different diversity categories through the use of lecturers.  One can achieve 
some subject matter diversity by having a visiting lecturer teach bankruptcy.  
But having an African American woman as a lecturer is nowhere near the 
same with respect to personal-characteristic diversity as having such a person 
there as a permanent member of the faculty. 
There are some categories of diversity where substitutes will do more or 
less for a while.  There are others where they will not.  But the aim as to all 
ought to be permanent tenured lateral appointments at a standard that nobody 
can properly criticize because it is a standard that the school applies all the 
time in making promotions.  And applying such a standard will allow a 
faculty to be the kind of diverse institution that it believes it should be and 
that any school that wants to be considered a great school must achieve. 
That said, let me end by reiterating that while I have views as to what kinds 
of diversity are important, my analysis of standards does not depend on those 
views.  In other words, each school will, and should, decide for itself what 
kind of diversities matter to it.  There is nothing inherently wrong with 
George Mason wishing to define itself as a law and economics school, with 
Yale in the 1930s viewing itself as a bastion of legal realism, or with a school 
believing it should be primarily an environmental law or a practice of law 
place.  A “great” school may want more.  But that is neither here nor there as 
far as this Essay is concerned.  My point is simply this:  as to the kinds of 
diversity a school decides it wants, or is in some sense required to have, there 
are ways of achieving that diversity through careful adherence to standards, 
but properly modified ones. 
APPENDIX:  TRANSCRIPT* 
PRESIDENT EMERITUS JOHN SEXTON:  In the present context, I am 
certain that in your mind finding appropriate representatives of the black 
community of America is more important than finding appropriate 
representatives of the Italian community. 
JUDGE GUIDO CALABRESI:  Yes. 
PRESIDENT EMERITUS SEXTON:  So how would you elaborate what 
your priority in categories would be? 
JUDGE CALABRESI:  I didn’t because I saw what is on the program for 
this afternoon and figured it would be addressed then.  I think it mattered for 
a very long time that I was the only practicing Roman Catholic on the Yale 
Law School faculty.  Priority will change with time:  I mean, when I came 
on women were as or more important than African Americans because it was 
 
*  This discussion followed the author’s presentation of this Essay at the Symposium.  The 
transcript has been lightly edited.  For a list of the Symposium participants, see Matthew 
Diller, Foreword:  Legal Education in Twentieth-Century America, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 859 
(2018). 
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such an outrage.  Hispanics, crucially important now, were not as important 
as African Americans, I think, because historically they are more like Italians 
were before. 
Steve Carter is for affirmative action but has said quite clearly that it cost 
him something because some people have said:  maybe you were appointed 
because you were an African American.26  Maybe he was.  I don’t know.  
There’s no one smarter than Steve Carter on a plain intellectual level, and if 
some people think he’s not smart . . . well, stupid them.  And, by the way, if 
affirmative action costs some people something—and it does—think of the 
costs to those left out without it.  Frankly, I don’t mind the costs to those 
African Americans who were so brilliant they would make it regardless of 
anything because they’ve got a lot going for them.  And I feel that way 
because of the affirmative action I received.  You know, I got affirmative 
action all the way through because Italians were just beginning to be 
considered.  I once wrote I saw no reason to give affirmative action to the 
Yale-educated son of the Yale-educated Governor of Puerto Rico.  I was 
wrong and let me tell you why. 
Do any of you know Frank Iacobucci,27 former dean of Toronto Law 
School, president of Toronto University, one of the great Canadian scholars, 
and a member of the Toronto Supreme Court?  When I first met him he said:  
“you know, Guido, I owe you a lot.”  I said:  “that’s interesting, we’ve never 
met.”  He said:  “I was going to school at Toronto and fell in love with the 
law.  I told my parents I’m going to be a law professor.  They said you can’t, 
you’re an Italian Canadian.”  (This was Toronto in the 1950s and 1960s, not 
Toronto today.)  “The next day I saw that Guido Calabresi had become 
Professor of Law at Yale, the youngest in the school’s history, and I said, ‘if 
it can happen to an Italian at Yale, it can happen to me in Toronto.’”  My 
own view is that this affirmative thing is much more about what we need than 
anything about the individual. 
PROFESSOR ROBIN WEST:  Should there be a different standard 
between what’s required for promotion from within and what’s required for 
lateral appointments?  When you promote from within you’re recognizing 
not only that person’s accomplishments, but also that person’s emergence as 
a full member of the community.  When you bring in someone laterally that 
person better be a superstar because we’re going to be stuck if the person 
turns out to be a jerk. 
JUDGE CALABRESI:  Of course, it is more dangerous to make a lateral 
appointment of any sort because you don’t know the person.  My rubric as 
dean was excellence but with humanity and decency, and that has always 
been; I hope that’s on my tombstone.  Yale’s tradition has been to make 
lateral appointments only after the person has come as a visitor.  And we have 
 
 26. See generally STEPHEN L. CARTER, REFLECTIONS OF AN AFFIRMATIVE ACTION BABY 
(1991). 
 27. The Honourable Frank Iacobucci, CC, QC, LLD, LSM, TORYS LLP, 
https://www.torys.com/people/iacobucci-the-honourable-frank [https://perma.cc/7ZGY-
HNSW] (last visited Nov. 15, 2018). 
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almost always required a visit.  During the time I was dean, we never made 
an offer to a person while the person was a visitor that that visitor did not 
accept.  That is, the community thing works both ways—we were using it 
both as a hiring tactic and as a way of getting to know them. 
PROFESSOR WILLIAM NELSON:  Two questions.  It seems to me that 
one of the great ideological issues of the day is whether personal-identity 
diversity is good to have.  And, have you thought about extending this to 
student diversity as well as faculty diversity? 
JUDGE CALABRESI:  I have no doubt that personal-identity diversity is 
one of the issues of the day.  I have no doubt that there has been a campaign 
of the racist Right to do this—to avoid integration—and on that I’m fierce 
and ideologically committed.  I think this is the South playing the South’s 
game as it did after the Civil War and I have no patience with it.  I do not 
think there is anything against affirmative action in the language of due 
process or the history of equal protection if you want to be an originalist.  
Even my nephew, Steven Calabresi, believes that originalism in terms of 
equal protection had affirmative action;28 you cannot look at it in any other 
way.  Personally, I got a lot of affirmative action as an Italian.  It isn’t until 
affirmative action starts being given to blacks that the whole fuss starts to 
come out. 
PROFESSOR DANIEL COQUILLETTE:  When I was dean, the Asian 
Pacific law student group came in and said they were worried because they 
believed Boston College was trying to increase diversity by lumping together 
African American, Asian American, and Latino applicants.  They were 
worried that as the number of Asian American applicants continued to 
increase rapidly, the diversity standard would turn into a quota.  The second 
thing they said was that, while Asian American applicants shared racial 
characteristics, we’re not the same.  Some of us come from the wealthiest 
families in America.  They argued you have to look at us as being very 
different. 
I did not have a good answer at the tip of my tongue.  All I could say was 
that because of the way you look, all of you may suffer discrimination 
because of your Asian background.  They were not happy with that and they 
were afraid of quotas.  Looking now, Asian American enrollments are 
growing29 and we don’t have enough Asian Americans on faculties.30  I 
wondered what you have to say about that? 
 
 28. See generally Steven G. Calabresi & Michael W. Perl, Originalism and Brown v. 
Board of Education, 2014 MICH. ST. L. REV. 429. 
 29. See Scott Jaschik, The Numbers and the Arguments on Asian Admissions, INSIDE 
HIGHER ED (Aug. 7, 2017), https://www.insidehighered.com/admissions/article/2017/08/07/ 
look-data-and-arguments-about-asian-americans-and-admissions-elite [https://perma.cc/LQ 
2V-R8GX] (noting that Asian Americans tend to “fare well beyond their numbers in admission 
to top colleges”—with Asian Americans comprising 22 percent of Harvard University’s 
freshman class in 2017 yet only making up about 5 percent of the population at public high 
schools). 
 30. See James Lindgren, Measuring Diversity:  Law Faculties in 1997 and 2013, 39 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 89, 143 (2016). 
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JUDGE CALABRESI:  Now and for the next period of time, the notion 
that there might be so many Asian Americans looking for faculty 
appointments that it would hurt diversity to name all of them is not really 
there.  I do agree very much that how you lump people together is very 
important.  I’ve always been troubled by the fact that Filipinos, to their 
tremendous disadvantage, tend to be lumped with Asian Americans rather 
than with Hispanics, which in most ways historically is how they were treated 
by the United States.  The pressure with Asian American students to do the 
equivalent of quotas is there, however, and I think we have to fight it. 
PRESIDENT EMERITUS SEXTON:  I want to add two angles that might 
be helpful to thinking about this.  There’s a book by Bill Bowen, former 
president of Princeton, about admission of athletes to elite colleges.  His data 
revealed that 40 percent of the men admitted to Amherst and Williams were 
admitted by coaches without reference to the admissions committee.31  Data 
for Harvard, Princeton, and Yale show very high SAT scores and class 
standings for the general student body and completely separate, non-
overlapping data for the recruited athletes, who were also a less racially 
diverse group than the general student body.32  People forget that every kid 
on Long Island is playing lacrosse, tennis, or golf.  People think of legacies 
first, but the big scandal is around recruited athletes. 
My second point is about subsidiaries.  A key number in university budgets 
is personnel:  in most places, 60 percent of the overall budget is for personnel 
and 40 percent of that is faculty, sometimes 50 percent.  So when you’re 
looking at these huge budgets, how you allocate your faculty resource money 
is key and that depends on whether you believe the accounts being given to 
you.  When I sat in the Dean’s Council in the early 1990s, every dean claimed 
that his or her school was excellent, and three-fourths of them were obviously 
wrong.  The danger is that B+ deans tend to appoint B- faculty; the best deans 
are A- because they are not afraid to surround themselves with people better 
than they are, A+ people.  And this gets into this principle of subsidiarity. 
One issue at NYU Law School was clinicians.  Under Norman Dorsen’s 
guidance, what we did at NYU was to make sure clinicians had the same 
rights, the same compensation, the same dignity.  They got to vote on 
everything including tenure votes to the academic chamber as we called it, 
but we counted the votes differently.  It gave dignity. 
PROFESSOR NELSON:  But not power. 
PRESIDENT EMERITUS SEXTON:  Well, yes and no.  It actually gave 
power to the academic faculty over clinical appointments because you had to 
get a majority of the whole faculty on an appointment or promotion matter 
and two-thirds of your own chamber.  So given the relative numbers that 
made the academic faculty feel that they were still in control.  But on 
legislative matters, everybody voted equally. 
 
 31. See generally WILLIAM G. BOWEN & SARAH A. LEVIN, RECLAIMING THE GAME:  
COLLEGE SPORTS AND EDUCATIONAL VALUES (2003). 
 32. Id. at 142. 
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JUDGE CALABRESI:  On athletics, I’m inclined to agree with you.  It is 
a scandal in any number of places.  Back to law school, Yale admissions were 
unusual because every file that got through a first cut—maybe 1500 to 
2000—was read by three faculty members in piles of one hundred and given 
a grade of four, three, two, or one.  Children of alums got an extra point.  
Everyone read one or two hundred files except the head of the admissions 
committee, who was too busy, and the dean, who wasn’t trusted on 
admissions.  I got a call asking whether we could admit the son of the head 
of the judiciary committee; my answer, I don’t do admissions.  That we gave 
an extra point was a useful thing to tell alums that we don’t care whether you 
give money or have money, but we are a family and we do this openly.  After 
I stopped being dean the system was changed, and there is now more pressure 
for some alum children who have connections and so on to get in. 
PRESIDENT EMERITUS SEXTON:  I will say that my predecessor at 
NYU, Norman Redlich, was pure, even purer than you describe.  I adopted a 
different approach.  We never sold a seat.  I gave applicants I was interested 
in a ranking of one, two, three, and four.  What I wanted from the admissions 
committee was an honest answer about whether the person could do the work.  
If they could do the work, and admitting that student would create $20 
million in financial aid, I would do it.  We did not, in the case of that offer, 
because the student was not good enough.  But, if he had been judged by the 
committee as sufficiently capable, we would have. 
JUDGE CALABRESI:  We would not, probably because we could afford 
not to. 
PRESIDENT EMERITUS SEXTON:  Right.  It’s easy to say. 
JUDGE CALABRESI:  We had an issue about whether the children of 
faculty members who had gone to a law school other than Yale should receive 
an extra point.  In the end, Harry Wellington decided no.  So we also stopped 
giving the point to Yale graduates on the faculty.  But what if the faculty 
member’s wife was a Yale Law School graduate?  Obviously the child got 
the point. 
PRESIDENT EMERITUS SEXTON:  We gave the top, number one 
ranking, during my time as dean to the child of anyone who had worked at 
the Law School for more than ten years, and that included security guards, 
janitors; so it ended up number one had some really great stories attached to 
it that were highly defensible. 
